Abstract: This paper tests the hypothesis that referrals from various sources provide employers with more information about job applicants than they would have without a referral. I use data that contain information on two workers in the same job, allowing me to cancel out differences in job and firm characteristics and control for the possibility that workers with referrals from different sources (or no referral at all) sort into jobs that put different weights on individual performance. The estimation results are consistent with referrals from current employees providing employers with more information than they would have otherwise. Additionally, it appears as though hiring through friends or relatives of the employer may involve some favoritism that results in employers either collecting less information than they would otherwise or ignoring information when setting wages. I also find weak evidence consistent with referrals from other firms or labor unions providing useful information, and no evidence that referrals from community organizations or other sources have any effect. JEL Codes: J6, M51, J31, D83
This paper tests the hypothesis that referrals from various sources provide employers with more information about job applicants than they would have without a referral. The focus is on two testable implications of this hypothesis.
First, since more precise information at the time of hiring will make employers more con…dent in their initial estimates of a worker's productivity, the initial wages of workers who received an informative referral should be more correlated with the employers' evaluations of their productivity than will the wages of workers who are hired without a referral. Secondly, employer learning will have less of an e¤ect on the wages of workers who received informative referrals than it will on the wages of workers hired without a referral because employers will have less to learn about referred workers'productivity.
The importance of referrals to both the recruitment e¤orts of …rms and the job search of individuals is well known. Rees and Schultz (1970) found that referrals are the most commonly used informal recruitment channel, and are the preferred method of recruitment for some …rms. Holzer (1987) and Castilla (2005) found that referrals from employees and other employers produce new hires with higher performance and lower turnover. Holzer (1988) , and Blau and Robins (1990) present evidence suggesting that referrals from friends and family members are more e¤ective at producing job o¤ers and acceptances than are other search methods.
The idea that referrals provide employers with more precise information than other hiring channels do is not new. Rees and Schultz (1970) argue that referrals being informative could explain their …ndings. It also provides an intuitively 1 appealing explanation for the other results noted above. All of these …ndings, however, have alternative explanations, leaving open the question of whether or not referrals really are as informative as we think they are.
Perhaps the simplest explanation for the previous literature's observations about referrals is that referrals allow …rms to select from a pool of more capable applicants.
1 Kugler (2003) and others have suggested that referred workers might also be preferred by some employers because the employee who referred them can exert peer pressure. 2 Reynolds (1951) argues that the use of referrals produces "congeniality in the work force" and new hires who live close to the plant, both of which improve retention. 3 Fernandez and Weinberg (1997) suggest that the e¤ectiveness of referrals at producing job o¤ers may stem from referred workers having inside information about that …rm's hiring practices.
Finally, Loury (2006) provides evidence that, in some cases, the lower turnover of referred workers might be due to referrals being used as a last resort by workers who have few alternatives.
The only previous work in the economics literature to test the hypothesis that referrals provide employers with more precise information than other recruiting methods is Simon and Warner (1992) . Using the matching framework of Jovanovic (1979) , they argue that if referrals reduce uncertainty about match productivity they will result in higher initial wages and lower average wage growth on the job, as well as lower quit rates. Their estimates from a sample of scientists and engineers support these predictions.
Unfortunately, the empirical results of Simon and Warner (1992) could also be explained by factors other than the informational content of referrals. As they acknowledge, the predictions of their model cannot be distinguished from e¤ects due to favoritism. Their predictions would also follow if referred workers were initially more productive than others and non-referred workers underwent additional training on the job to catch up. 4 Finally, their data limit the ability to control for referrals sorting workers into di¤erent types of jobs than other recruiting channels do, as is predicted by Kugler (2003) and suggested by the empirical results of Devaro (2005).
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Fernandez, Castilla and Moore (2000) (FCM) also consider the hypothesis that employers learn more from referrals than from other recruiting channels in their extensive examination of hiring in a customer service phone center. 7 They argue that, if referrals from current employees are informative, the characteristics of the referrers will be correlated with the probability of the referred applicants receiving an interview or a job o¤er. Characteristics of the referrer, however, might also be correlated with characteristics of the applicants due to homophily in social networks, which implies that their tested prediction 4 See Mortensen (1988) for a discussion of how similar the empirical implications of matching and on-the-job training can be. 5 The sample Simon and Warner (1992) use may alleviate this problem; however, it is unlikely that all jobs that hire engineers or scientists put the same amount of weight on individual performance when setting wages and are uniform in unobserved qualities. 6 Kugler (2003) develops a model of dual labor markets in which "good" jobs are sensitive to individual performance and require a referral. Devaro (2005) documents associations between skill requirements and other job characteristics and the …rm's choice of recruiting method. 7 Castilla (2005) suggests that di¤erences in productivity can be used to test this hypothesis; however, productivity di¤erences could arise for many reasons, as noted above. could also be explained by referral applicants being drawn from a better pool of workers. 8 Furthermore, even if HR personnel in this establishment do form expectations about an applicant based in part on the characteristics of the referring worker, this test says nothing about how accurate those expectations are relative to expectations formed when another worker responds to a newspaper add or walks in o¤ the street. 9 The tests in the current paper are based on previous work on statistical discrimination and the tested predictions hold in any environment in which wages are based on expected productivity, including the matching framework used by Simon and Warner (1992) . An important contribution of this paper is that the tested predictions can be distinguished from e¤ects of average productivity differing by referral type, and from e¤ects of favoritism. 10 Furthermore, the data used in this paper includes information on two workers in the same job, which allows di¤erences in job and …rm characteristics to be removed.
The estimation results are consistent with referrals from current employees providing employers with more information than they would have otherwise.
Additionally, I …nd evidence that suggests hiring through friends or relatives of 8 The fact that HR personnel in the …rm FCM study claim to never have time to talk to workers who refer applicants would make it even more likely that a positive result from this test (which they don't …nd) is due to homophily in social networks. Yakubovich and Lup (2006) look at a di¤erent …rm, and do …nd evidence consistent with the proposed test in FCM; however, they seem to attribute it to productive workers simply referring more productive applicants. Consistent with this interpretation, they only …nd an e¤ect of the referrer's characteristics on objective steps in the evaluation process (such as test scores), as opposed to subjective steps where the conditional expectation of the applicant's productivity might matter. 9 Walking into an establishment in response to a "help wanted" sign could send a very clear signal, depending on the employer's past experience. Furthermore, not being referred could also be informative, just as not having a certain level of education can be informative.
1 0 Simon and Warner (1992) argued that distinguishing di¤erences in information from favoritism was an important task for future research. 4 the employer involves favoritism that results in employers'either collecting less information than they would otherwise or ignoring information when setting wages. I …nd weak evidence of referrals from other …rms and labor unions being informative, and no evidence that referrals from schools, community organizations or other sources provide any useful information.
The next section explains how di¤erences in the reliability of initial information can a¤ect wages. Section 2 then describes the data used in this paper.
Section 3 discusses estimation, as well as issues such as favoritism and unobserved job characteristics. Section 4 presents estimation results, and Section 5 concludes.
Wages, Performance and Initial Information
The tests conducted in this paper are based on the framework developed in Pinkston (2003) to test the hypothesis that employers are better able to evaluate the ability of men at the time of hiring than the ability of women. Whether one is considering di¤erences based on gender or referrals the implications are the same:
1. The more accurate the employer's initial signal of worker productivity is the more that worker's wage will be correlated with the employer's assessment of the worker's ability, and 2. The more accurate initial information is the less employer learning will a¤ect wages as tenure increases.
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Suppose a …rm observes a signal of productivity for each worker i who received a referral of type j at the time of hiring:
where 0i is worker i's productivity, " ij N 0; 2 "j and 2 "j varies by referral type j. This signal can include information gathered from initial interviews and tests, as well as whatever the referrer said about the worker. The important assumption at this point is that any information contained in a referral a¤ects the variance of the initial signal around the worker's true productivity. As that information becomes more (or less) reliable, Assume the employer also observes a vector of worker characteristics X i and initial productivity is a known linear function of X i and an error term:
where is common knowledge and 2 is the same for all groups. The initial signal can then be used to predict the part of a worker's productivity that is not already explained by education and other easily-observed characteristics.
Letting e s ij denote the part of s ij that is not correlated with X i , the conditional expectation of productivity given X i and s ij is
. It is now easy to see that the more precise the signal from a referral of type j, the smaller 2 "j is and the larger j is.
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The assumption implicit in equation (1) that initial productivity does not vary by group is made for the sake of simplicity. Aigner and Cain (1977) discuss analogous distinctions between e¤ects of di¤erences in the precision of information and e¤ects of di¤erences in average ability across groups in the context of statistical discrimination based on race. Similarly, the tested implications in this paper are robust to groups di¤ering in productivity, as long as the variance of productivity that is not explained by observable characteristics, 2 v , is the same for all groups.
11 Therefore, the empirical results of this paper cannot be explained by referred workers being more capable, or performing better due to peer pressure.
Of course, we do not observe the initial signal s ij in the data. 12 What we do observe is an employer-provided evaluation of the worker's productivity at some tenure t. Assume for now that the evaluation of productivity at t is
where S tj is an unbiased estimate of initial ability based on the initial signal s ij and performance on the job, and Z t is the known e¤ect of tenure and training on productivity. 13 As Pinkston (2003) discusses in greater detail, the variance of S tj is higher for higher values of the initial signal's variance, 2 "j ; but it also decreases in tenure faster for higher values of 2 "j . In other words, the precision of the productivity measure is increasing in tenure for all workers, but increases more quickly for groups with less precise initial signals.
Assuming wages at tenure t are equal to expected productivity conditional on observed characteristics and P t , we can write
The coe¢ cient P j increases in tenure as employers learn and P tj becomes more precise; however, it increases more slowly the more precise initial information is. In other words, the more information the employer had initially, the less important later learning is. Furthermore, at t = 0, P j is an unbiased estimate of j from equation (2).
14 The more precise the initial signal is the larger this initial e¤ect will be.
The EOPP Data
This paper uses data from the 1982 survey of the Employment Opportunity Pilot Project (EOPP), which contains responses from 3,420 establishments in 28 survey sites. 15 The 1982 survey followed the original 1980 EOPP survey, which was designed to evaluate the e¤ects of a job search and training pro-gram. 16 The 1980 survey oversampled establishments with a high proportion of low-wage employees, and the 1982 survey attempted to follow up with the same establishments. Establishments in both surveys were asked for information about the last worker hired, but only the 1982 survey contains the information on recruiting methods this paper requires.
An important feature of the 1982 EOPP data is that they contain a subsample of roughly 650 establishments that report data on a second worker hired for the same job as the last worker hired. 17 Di¤erencing two workers in the same job and establishment reduces bias caused by correlations between referrals and job characteristics. (The next subsection discusses this in greater detail.) For the sake of consistency, I restrict all estimates to this subsample even when those estimates do not use di¤erences between two workers; however, non-di¤erenced results in the full sample (not shown) are qualitatively similar to those from the restricted sample. 18 The productivity evaluations in the data are the employer's ranking of the worker's productivity in that job on a scale of zero to 100. 19 A rating of 100
indicates the highest possible productivity of a worker in that position. This is explained to the respondent, and they are then asked to rate each worker (and the "typical worker") at three di¤erent points: the …rst two weeks on the job, from the third to the twelfth week, and at either the date of the interview or the last week the worker was employed by the …rm. 20 I use the last of these evaluations and refer to it as "current productivity" in what follows.
21
The data also contain questions about how the worker was hired; i.e., using a newspaper ad, a referral from a current employee, etc. These questions identify several sources of referrals that are mutually exclusive in the data. Since the source likely a¤ects how informative a referral is, I divide my sample into workers who were referred by an employee of the …rm, workers referred by a friend or relative of the employer, workers referred by another employer or a labor union, all other referrals and no referral at all. 22 sample size. 2 0 If the employee is still with the establishment, which describes 67% of observations, the wage and performance evaluation are taken at the time of interview. If the employee no longer works at the …rm, the wage and performance evaluation are the most recent available.
When a dummy variable for the worker still be employed by the …rm is added to regressions, its coe¢ cient is not statistically signi…cant and other results do not change. Limiting attention to cases in which neither worker left produces qualitatively similar results, but standard errors are much higher due to the smaller sample size. 2 1 Previous versions of the paper also used the measure of productivity in the …rst two weeks on the job as a proxy for the initial signal in a regression based on equation (2) . Since it is not clear how this measure relates to the initial signal (whether it's in ‡uenced by more recent performance, etc.), it is di¢ cult to know what bias its use as a proxy introduces. Furthermore, this measure becomes less correlated with initial wages as the time since the worker started increases, suggesting recall bias. Since referral types di¤er in the average time since the worker's start date, this recall bias could in ‡uence comparisons of referral types. Regressions that relied on this early measure of productivity did not provide evidence consitent with referrals being informative.
2 2 I group referrals from friends and family of the employer together, and group referrals from other employers with those from labor unions due to the small sample size. "Other" referrals come from schools, employment agencies, community organizations, etc. Preliminary estimation that separated each of these groups into more speci…c referral types suggested that the component types behave similarly. Intuitively, …rms and unions are both professional connections, while "other" referrals come from organizations that might be assisting low-skilled workers.
Limiting attention to establishments that report at least some information on two workers leaves 659 establishments (and worker pairs). I then drop 46 worker pairs in which the workers'pay is based on commission, tips or a piecerate scale; 13 pairs in which one worker's start date was more than four years before the interview date; 37 pairs in which tenure is not reported for one of the workers and cannot be calculated because start date is not reported; and two pairs in which one worker was younger than 16.
23 ; 24 Finally, two pairs are excluded because they appear unlikely to have been hired for the same job. 25 The resulting sample has 447 worker pairs and 894 individual workers. and almost 43 months of prior experience that the employer believes "had some application to the position". The average productivity of a worker in her …rst two weeks, on a scale of 0 to 100, is 52.47, and the average current productivity is 76.27. 26 About 45% of the sample of 894 workers had no referral, 26% were 2 3 Workers paid by piece-rate, commission or tips are excluded because such pay re ‡ects the worker's actual performance, not the employer's expectation of that worker's productivity. Because the tests in this paper are based on employers' expectations, including these observations biases results and creates the impression that employers know more about worker productivity than they really do. The correlation of wages and performance is over three times as large in these jobs as in the estimation sample. (If this correlation weren't higher, we would have reason to worry about the performance measure.) I found no evidence that these jobs are associated with any referral types. I also estimated a regression on a sample that did include these jobs, but used interaction terms to allow the relationship between wages and performance to be di¤erent for jobs in which pay is based directly on performance. The results were similar to those presented in Section 4 for jobs that don't involve performance pay. 2 4 Workers who started more than four years before the interview date are excluded because their employers are outliers in terms of how infrequently they hire. Preliminary estimation obtained qualitatively similar results without this restriction, or that on age. 2 5 Their starting wages di¤er by over $10 per hour, their ages di¤er by 23 or more years, and their relevant experience di¤ers by almost 20 years. 2 6 The distribution of current productivity is skewed to the right. The median is 80, 75
referred by an employee of the …rm, 5.4% by a friend or family member of the employer, 5.5% by another employer or a labor union, and 18% were referred by some other source. suggests that di¤erent types of referrals are associated with di¤erent worker and job characteristics. The wages and productivity of workers with referrals from other …rms or unions are signi…cantly higher than the wages and productivity of workers with no referral, while the early productivity of workers with a referral from community groups, schools, etc. is slightly lower. The average worker who was referred by a friend or relative of the employer works in an establishment of 31 workers, while the average worker who was hired without a referral is in an establishment with 200 workers. Workers referred by an employee of the …rm have higher tenure than workers hired without a referral. 27 They are also more likely to be in professional, managerial and technical occupations than are workers with no referral, and are less likely to be in bench work occupations. 28 Finally, it should be acknowledged that this survey is over two decades old, and we should be cautious about generalizing results to more recent labor markets. Nonetheless, the data provide a unique opportunity to study referrals, and more recent evidence suggests referrals are still an important part of hiring and job search. Holzer (1996) …nds similar percentages of workers being hired percent have an evaluation of 70 or higher, and 90 percent have an evaluation or 50 or higher.
As noted in Frazis and Loewenstein (2007) , reported values also tend to be clustered at multiples of 5. Section 3.3 will discuss the robustness of tests to relaxing assumptions about the productivity measure.
through referrals in data collected between 1992 and 1994. 29 Using more recent data, Marmaros and Sacerdote (2002) and Mayer (2010) …nd that social networks play an important role in the labor market outcomes of recent college graduates. 30 Finally, a simple comparison of data on job search methods used by respondents in the 2007 wave of the NLSY97 to methods used by respondents in the 1986 wave of the NLSY79 suggests that the use of friends and family has, if anything, increased over the past two decades. 31 
Estimation and Alternative Explanations
Wage regressions based on equation (3) approximate P j using a linear interaction of performance with tenure:
where D j are dummy variables for referral group (the omitted group is those with no referral); and X controls for observed characteristics, including tenure and a constant. The coe¢ cients on productivity interacted with the group dummies, 0j , capture the di¤erence in the initial signal's e¤ect on starting 2 9 25-26% were referred by current employees; 13-15% by the sum of unions, the employers' acquaintances, etc.; and 13-18% by employment services, community groups and schools. The data he used came from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, which would not allow a comparision of two workers in the same job. The ranges in estimates depend on the subsample used. 3 1 Each survey asks a series of questions about job search methods used during the respondents' most recent unemployment spell. Limiting each sample to workers who were 22-28 years old, I found that roughly 41% contacted friends and family in 1986, while almost 54% contacted friends and family in 2007. I leave a more careful analysis of how job search methods have changed over time to future research. 13 wages for group j relative to those without referrals, while tj captures the di¤erence in the e¤ect of employer learning for that group. 32 If the signals employers receive when hiring workers through referral type j are informative, 0j will be positive and tj will be negative. This re ‡ects the greater initial weight put on productivity and lower e¤ect of learning for that referral type.
The dummy variables for referral type and the interactions of those referral variables with tenure will capture many possible e¤ects of referrals. For example, initial beliefs (correct or not) about average productivity di¤erences across referral types would a¤ect j , the coe¢ cients on referral dummy variables. Effects of referrals on productivity after the worker is hired would be captured by referral type interacted with tenure. 33 In any case, the speci…c implications this paper tests do not involve wage premiums, group-speci…c di¤erences in productivity or other e¤ects of referrals re ‡ected in j and tj : They involve the correlation of wages and productivity re ‡ected in 0j and tj .
All regressions use wage levels, not logs. 34 The individual characteristics contained in X are gender, a quartic polynomial in age, experience the em-ployer considers relevant, dummy variables for education level, and missing value dummy variables for age, experience, and education. In speci…cations that do not use di¤erences between workers in the same job, I control for di¤erences in job characteristics by including establishment size, the percent of employees that are unionized, a missing value dummy for that percent, and dummy variables for occupation, industry and survey site.
Favoritism and Social Networks
The e¤ects of favoritism are easily separated from evidence of informative referrals in results based on equation (4) . The coe¢ cients on the dummy variables for referral type, j , will capture any initial premium paid to workers who have certain connections. 35 If such a premium then decreases with tenure, which would be consistent with Simon and Warner (1992) , the coe¢ cient on that referral type interacted with tenure, tj , will re ‡ect that decrease.
Favoritism could also result in employers bypassing normal screening procedures when hiring a worker, or otherwise result in hiring and wage decisions being based on something other than information about productivity. 36 In those cases, favoritism would have the opposite e¤ect on the correlation between wages and productivity evaluations as an informative referral. A referral type that involved favoritism might initially appear to provide less information about the worker than no referral, and employer learning would have a greater e¤ect on later wages. 37 In other words, 0j in equation (4) would be negative, and tj would be positive.
It's also possible that workers who are capable of getting referrals to employers in the survey have better social networks than workers hired without referrals, and they might receive more (or better) outside o¤ers as a result. In models of asymmetric employer learning, …rms often pay workers less than their expected productivity because competition is limited by other …rms knowing less about the worker than the current employer does. 38 Pinkston (2009) shows that, if outside employers are capable of collecting private signals (through interviews, for example), competition can cause wages to converge to the employer's conditional expectation despite the current employer having more precise information. Therefore, wages might be more correlated with productivity for some referral types simply because those referral types are associated with better social networks and greater competition for the workers'labor.
In contrast to the predictions I test, such di¤erences in social networks would imply that the correlation of wages and productivity would increase faster with tenure for referral types that are associated with better social networks because increased competition from outside …rms would reduce an employer's ability to exploit an informational advantage. Furthermore, this increase in competition would imply a higher quit rate for those referral types, which does not …t the data. 39 Finally, note that applicants, as well as …rms, can learn from referrals.
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If applicants use their social networks simply to …nd jobs that pay better, the referral-speci…c intercepts would be a¤ected, but the tests this paper focuses on would not be. On the other hand, applicants using their social networks to …nd jobs that base pay more on performance than other jobs do could a¤ect the outcomes of our tests. Essentially, this might be an avenue through which the worker sorting Kugler (2003) discusses might unfold, and it provides another reason to compare workers who are in the same job, as is discussed in the next subsection.
Unobserved Job Characteristics
As mentioned above, there is reason to worry that referral type might be associated with unobserved job characteristics. To model this in a simple manner, 3 9 Holzer (1987) …nds that workers referred by an employee are more likely to still be employed by the …rm at the time of interview. In my own regressions (not shown), I do not …nd a statistically signi…cant relationship, but the results are qualitatively similar to Holzer's. 4 0 In the economics literature this is often discussed as a means of learning about potential job openings. Examples include Montgomery (1991) and Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004).
In the sociology literature (e.g., Fernandez and Weinberg (1997) and FCM) there appears to be more interest in applicants learning about the organization itself.
we can add an unobserved …rm-or job-speci…c term to equation (4):
The possibility that e f is correlated with referral types suggests that any of the coe¢ cients on referral dummy variables or their interactions could su¤er from omitted variable bias. Productivity evaluations might also be correlated with e f if they are relative to the expectations of the speci…c job, introducing further bias.
Having data on two workers in the same job allows us to cancel out …rm-or job-speci…c variables by considering di¤erences between the two workers. Given two workers, i = 1; 2, the di¤erence in current wages is
+ X j 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
where D ij are the dummy variables for worker i having referral type j, and P ti are the evaluations of worker i. Any …rm-or job-speci…c characteristics in X or the error term cancel out, eliminating potential bias due to unobserved job characteristics.
A more di¢ cult problem comes from the possibility that …rms do not simply pay workers wages equal to expected productivity, and that there is heterogeneity across …rms in the degree to which wages are correlated with productivity. If some referral types are associated with jobs that put more weight on individual productivity when setting wages, as suggested by Kugler (2003) , both the initial e¤ect of productivity on wages and the later e¤ects of employer learning will be larger for those groups. This bias would not replicate the e¤ect of employers'having more precise information, but it might obscure the true di¤erences between groups. Fortunately, problems due to referrals being associated with jobs that put more or less weight on performance are also reduced by di¤erenc-ing, as the identi…cation comes from jobs where the two workers have di¤erent referral types. 41 In Section 4, I consider the degree to which the main results appear consistent with an association between referral type and the correlation of wages and productivity, along with other evidence that might suggest such an association.
Assumptions about the Productivity Evaluation
In Section 1, the productivity evaluation, P tj , was assumed to be the sum of an unbiased estimate of initial ability and on-the-job human capital accumulation.
As discussed in Section 2, the actual variable in the EOPP data is a subjective ranking of workers on a scale of zero to 100. Bishop (1987) points out that this measure cannot be treated as an absolute measure of productivity, but argues that it is an accurate measure of relative productivity when comparing two workers in the same job. 42 Furthermore, this relative measure might be based on observed performance in period t, instead of being based on a weighted 4 1 Roughly 60% of workers who were hired through a referral of some type are paired with a worker who did not receive the same type of referral. 4 2 Bishop (1987) found that estimates of relative productivity di¤erences within a job from the EOPP data are similar to estimates obtained in studies that used actual measures of output.
average of every signal the …rm has received since its …rst contact with the worker.
Neither of these deviations from the assumptions of Section 1 would qualitatively a¤ect the predictions tested in this paper, but they might cause e¤ects of productivity di¤erences to be understated, making it more di¢ cult to …nd evidence of informative referrals. 43 Essentially, they both suggest that we observe something that is correlated with actual performance at t, t , instead of the unbiased result of employer learning plus accumulated human capital. The use of such a measure would be analogous to the use of test scores by Altonji and Pierret (2001) to investigate employer learning and statistical discrimination. 44 We would still expect wages to be more correlated with such a measure when the employer had better initial information. Furthermore, wages would become more correlated with such a measure as the employer learned more about the worker, but employer learning would a¤ect wages less when the employer knows more about the worker initially.
I consider two robustness checks to empirically support the argument that the use of a relative ranking instead of a measure of absolute productivity is not driving the results of this paper. The …rst is motivated by the observation that, if the observed productivity evaluation is based on a multiplicative rescaling of actual productivity, using di¤erences in the natural log of the observed measure would allow that rescaling to di¤erence out. Results from these estimates (not shown) are qualitatively similar to those from the preferred speci…cation, but some statistical signi…cance is lost.
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The second robustness test, which is discussed further in Section 4.2, considers sensitivity of the results to adding job-speci…c variables that would be correlated with the typical level of absolute productivity expected in the job.
This test is motivated by the observation that job-speci…c scaling of the productivity evaluations might not be di¤erenced out in speci…cation like that in equation (4) . If the main results are a¤ected by such job-speci…c terms being left in the error term of the di¤erenced regressions, then adding variables to the regression that are correlated with the typical levels of productivity in the job should a¤ect the results.
Results
The main results of the paper are presented in the following Subsection. If a type of referral is informative, we expect to see:
1. a positive coe¢ cient on that referral type interacted with the productivity measure, and 2. a negative coe¢ cient on the interaction of the referral type, productivity and tenure.
On the other hand, we would expect the opposite results for referrals that involved favoritism; i.e., the results would appear to suggest such referrals were less informative than no referral at all. Section 4.2 presents empirical tests of the robustness of the main results. Section 4.3 presents supplementary results on e¤ects of referrals on performance.
Main Results
The estimated coe¢ cients presented in Table 3a suggest that referrals from employees and from other …rms or unions provide employers with useful information. Signi…cantly more weight is put on productivity initially for each of these referral types. The interaction of a referral from an employee with productivity has a coe¢ cient of 0.0196 (0.0101) in column II, which presents the di¤erenced speci…cation, and the coe¢ cient on a referral from another …rm or labor union is 0.0266 (0.0155). 46 Furthermore, the coe¢ cients on Productivity
Tenure interacted with having a referral from an employee is -0.0015 (0.0007) and that on the interaction with a referral from another …rm or labor union is -0.0016 (0.0022). While only the coe¢ cient on the interaction with tenure and a referral from an employee is statistically signi…cant, both of these e¤ects are of the expected sign. 4 6 What might seem like small e¤ects of productivity are not surprising. Previous work by Bishop (1987) and Frazis and Loewenstein (2007) documented that wages in this data are compressed relative to productivity. Uncertainty about workers' true abilities, which exists even with informative referrals, would reduce the correlation of individual productivity and wages. Furthermore, the problems discussed in Section 3.3 imply that these coe¢ cients are smaller in magnitude than they would be if a measure of absolute (not relative) performance were used. Finally, over half the jobs in the data are in clerical, sales or service occupations where the correlation between wages and productivity is the weakest. (0.05 versus 0.196 for all other occupations.) Table 3a also presents evidence that is consistent with referrals from the employers' friends and relatives involving favoritism that allows these workers to bypass the …rm's usual screening or wage-setting practices. The coe¢ cient on productivity interacted with such a referral is -0.0278 (0.0120) and that on pro- Because the coe¢ cients in Table 3a may be di¢ cult to interpret, Table 3b presents di¤erences in the e¤ects of productivity on wages between each referral group and workers hired without a referral at various levels of tenure. At the time of hiring, a one-standard-deviation increase in productivity raises the wage of a worker referred by an employee by $0.39 more per hour than it would increase the wage of a worker hired without a referral. This di¤erence is almost $0.53 if the worker was referred by another …rm or a labor union. On the other hand, this increase in productivity would raise the hourly wage of a worker referred by a friend or relative of the employer by almost $0.56 less than it would increase the wage of a worker hired with no referral at all.
These di¤erences decrease over time as employers learn more about workers.
Nonetheless, it takes roughly a year of tenure for an employer to learn as much about a worker hired without a referral as they knew about a worker who was referred by an employee at the time of hiring, and almost 17 months to learn as much as they knew about a worker referred by another …rm or a union. It takes nearly 13 months for the apparent informational disadvantage of being referred by a friend or relative of the employer to dissipate. 47 As was mentioned above, results that appear to suggest referrals from the employer's friends and family members are less informative than no referral at all are consistent with favoritism. These workers might be hired without being subjected to the …rm's usual screening methods, or their initial wages might be set without regard to their expected productivity. Providing further evidence of favoritism, the results in Table 3c show that workers referred by friends or family of the employer are initially paid $0.52 more per hour than workers hired without a referral, but this di¤erence dissipates in roughly one year. 48 This is the same pattern of wages found by Simon and Warner (1992) . In contrast, the wage e¤ects of a referral from an employee of the …rm are relatively small, negative and statistically insigni…cant. The positive e¤ect of referrals from other …rms or labor unions appears to be constant over time, which might re ‡ect a union wage premium.
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Looking back at Table 3a , the importance of di¤erencing two workers in the same job is made clear by comparing columns I and II. The coe¢ cient on referrals from friends and family of the employer interacted with productivity decreases signi…cantly between columns. Both of the coe¢ cients on interactions of a referral from another …rm or labor union decrease in magnitude, and the change in the interaction with productivity and tenure is statistically signi…cant.
These di¤erences are consistent with these referral types being associated with unobserved job characteristics, or with jobs that put more weight on individual productivity than other jobs do.
To investigate this possibility further, I estimated a regression similar to that in column I of Table 3a , but replaced the worker's own referral type and its interactions with the referral type of the other worker in the same job and its interactions. The information an employer has about a worker's productivity should not be a¤ected by the referral of another worker, but any e¤ect of a referral being associated with a certain type of job should be picked up. The results (not shown) suggest that the other worker being referred by another …rm of labor union is associated with jobs that put more weight on productivity, further highlighting the importance of focusing on di¤erences between workers in the same job. 
Robustness Tests
As mentioned in Section 2, questions about the workers are answered by the person responsible for hiring in an establishment. Although most establishments in the data are small (the median establishment employs 23 workers), one might worry that respondents in the larger establishments are less likely to be the workers'immediate supervisors and might be less able to accurately evaluate the workers' productivity. Since establishment size does vary by referral type, columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 present results that restrict the sample to establishments with not more than 100 and not more than 50 workers, respectively. (Column 1 presents the main results from Table 3a for comparison.)
The coe¢ cients for referrals from employees and from friends and family of the employer are not noticeably a¤ected by these restrictions, suggesting that these results are not driven by di¤erences in …rm size. The coe¢ cient on a referral from another …rm or a labor union does fall when establishments of more than 50 workers are excluded; however, this restriction may not be appropriate for these referrals because they are associated with larger …rms.
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Another concern, which is mentioned in Section 3, is that human capital accumulation on the job might vary by referral type. The preferred speci…ca-tion addresses this by including controls for tenure and its interactions with referral type, but direct information on training is excluded because of its likely endogeneity. Column 4 of Table 4 adds di¤erences in hours of both formal and informal training, as well as a dummy variable for missing training information. 52 None of the coe¢ cients of interest appear sensitive to the addition of training variables, which they should be if di¤erences in human capital accumulation were a¤ecting the results.
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Finally, Section 3.3 discusses problems that might arise due to the productivity evaluations being ordinal rankings. Coe¢ cients in Table 3 could be biased toward zero if there is some job-speci…c scaling of the productivity evaluations that is not removed by the use of di¤erences. Controlling for a variable that is correlated with the level of productivity that the employer expects in the job should reduce any such bias. Column 5 of Table 4 presents results from a regression that controls for the hourly wage of the "typical" worker in the job after two years of tenure. 54 Once again, the coe¢ cients of interest are very close to those from Table 3 , suggesting that the main results are robust to effects of job-speci…c scaling of the productivity measure that aren't removed by di¤erencing.
Performance Regressions
If referrals allow employers to more accurately evaluate job applicants, workers hired through these referrals should have higher productivity than workers hired without one. Although there are other reasons referrals and worker productivity might be related, I examine this relationship in Table 5 , which presents results from regressions of the di¤erence in current productivity between workers in the same job. 55 Column II allows the e¤ect of a referral on productivity to vary with tenure, while column I does not.
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The results in Table 5 suggest that workers hired through referrals from employees and from other …rms or labor unions have higher productivity than similar workers hired with no referrals. 57 In column I, the coe¢ cients on referrals from employees and from other …rms or labor unions are large and statistically signi…cant at 8.16 (3.62) and 14.84 (6.94), respectively. In contrast, there is no evidence that referrals from the employer's friends or relatives are associated with higher productivity, further supporting the idea that these referrals might involve favoritism.
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The results in column II suggest that the positive e¤ect of an employee referral persists after hiring, as in Castilla (2005), while the e¤ect of a referral from another …rm or labor union fades with time on the job. The coe¢ cient on employee referrals changes very little in column II, and there is no evidence that workers referred by an employee accumulate human capital at a di¤erent rate from non-referred workers once the job starts. 59 On the other hand, the coe¢ cient on a referral from another …rm or a labor union rises to 22.19 (8.04) , and the coe¢ cient on the interaction of tenure with referrals from employers or unions is -0.79 (0.32). 5 6 The regressions presented in each column control for the same variables used in regressions on current wage di¤erences. 5 7 These results con…rm results in Holzer (1987) that do not look at di¤erences between workers in the same job. 5 8 This is particularly interesting given that these are subjective performance evaluations. Employers could in ‡ate evaluations to justify the premiums paid to workers they hire through their own friends and family, but Table 5 doesn't suggest that they do. 5 9 This provides further evidence suggesting that faster learning on the job is not likely to confound results for this group. 28 
Discussion
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that referrals from current employees provide employers with more information about job applicants than they would have otherwise. Evaluations of a worker's productivity have a larger (more positive) e¤ect on wages at the time of hiring for these workers than for workers who where hired without a referral, and employer learning has less of an e¤ect on their wages. The results are similar for referrals from other …rms or labor unions; however, the di¤erence in employer learning is not statistically signi…cant for this relatively rare referral type.
In contrast, the results appear to suggest that employers obtain less information at the time of hiring about workers who were referred by friends and relatives of the employer than they would collect without a referral. This result is consistent with favoritism allowing these workers to be hired with less scrutiny than other applicants, or with information simply being ignored when their wages are set. Providing further evidence of favoritism, I …nd that referrals from friends or family of the employer are unique in that they don't on average result in hiring more productive workers, but they are associated with a wage premium that declines with tenure on the job.
The results of this paper are consistent with the intuition expressed by Rees and Schultz (1970) and elsewhere. An employee who refers a friend or relative will at least be able to comment on character traits like honesty and reliable. 60 Previous employers and labor unions could transmit useful information through a referrals because they have observed the worker's past work or training. Finally, if any type of referral is to involve favoritism, it comes as no surprise that evidence of favoritism is found for referrals from the employer's own friends and family members.
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Finding that referrals from employees, other …rms and labor unions provide employers with more information than other hiring channels is consistent with earlier results in the literature. For example, Holzer (1988) and Blau and Robins (1990) …nd that referrals from a worker's friends and family are more e¤ective than other search methods when it comes to producing o¤ers and acceptances.
The statistical discrimination model of Cornell and Welch (1996) suggests that employers having more precise information about applicants with these types of referrals would explain the higher rate of o¤ers these referrals generate. The variance of expected productivity conditional on a signal is higher the more precise that signal is, which makes it more likely that the worker with highest conditional expectation in a pool of applicants is from the group with the most precise signal. Even if employers eventually learn everything about any worker they hire, workers with informative referrals will have an advantage in the hiring process. Similarly, employers are likely to hire workers who are more productive on average when their information about the ability of applicants is more precise, which is consistent with the results of Holzer (1987) and Castilla (2005) (and is con…rmed by this paper).
Of course, workers hired through informative referrals might also be more productive (receive more job o¤ers, etc.) because they are drawn from a pool of applicants that are more capable on average, because of peer pressure, or for some other reason. The work of FCM, Castilla (2005) and others in the sociology literature has emphasized the fact that no one e¤ect of social networks on the workplace happens in isolation. This paper has focused on only one part of a larger picture. Evidence that …rms learn more from referrals than other recruiting channels does not imply that referrals do not have many other e¤ects, even if those other e¤ects do not explain the particular testable implications this paper has focused on.
One avenue for future research would be the application of the tests developed in this paper to data from …rms' personnel records. This would allow researchers to consider whether a speci…c …rm was learning more from some recruiting methods than from others while also looking more broadly at the role of referrals in a …rm, as recommended by FCM. For example, the data used in Petersen, et al (2000) or Castilla (2005) could be used to conduct tests similar to those in this paper while also providing detail on those …rms that the cross-sectional data used in this paper does not have. Notes: The regression in column (1) is the same as column II in Table 3a . Columns (2) and (3) restrict the sample to jobs in establishments with 100 or fewer workers and 50 or fewer workers, respectively. Column (4) uses the full sample, but adds differences in formal and informal training, as well as a dummy variable for missing training information. Column (5) controls for the hourly wage of the "typical" worker after two years on the job, and a corresponding missing value dummy variable. 
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